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We study the unique trust management, and more precisely reputation management and
revocation of malicious nodes in the context of ad hoc networks used for emergency
communications.
Unlike in centralized systems, reputation management and revocation in ad hoc networks
is non-trivial. This diﬃculty is due to the fact that the nodes have to collaboratively
calculate the reputation value of a particular node and then revoke the node if the
reputation value goes below a threshold. A major challenge in this scheme is to prevent
a malicious node from discrediting other genuine nodes. The decision to revoke a node
has to be communicated to all the nodes of the network. In traditional ad hoc networks
the overhead of broadcasting the message throughout the network may be very high. We
solve the problem of reputation management and node revocation in ad hoc networks of
cell phones by using a threshold cryptography based scheme. Each node of the network
would have a set of anonymous referees, which would store the reputation information of
the node and issue reputation certiﬁcates to the node with timestamps. The misbehavior of
a particular cell phone is reported to its anonymous referees, who issue certiﬁcates which
reﬂect the positive and negative recommendations.
© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
While we have developed a very rich communication environment, including a very reliable telephone network, wired
and wireless Internet, cell phones and WLANs, all of them fail when the respective infrastructure is damaged, such as in
natural or man made disaster situations. We believe that the research community should develop technical solutions to
guarantee necessary and vital communications in future emergency situations.
Cellular phones are ubiquitous. They offer many more features than traditional phones and connect to the network using
RF communication. It is estimated that there are about 271 million mobile phone users in USA [1], covering 88.04% of
population. Cell phones have a low power transceiver which communicates with the base stations that are typically located
a distance of a few miles. The base station connects the cell phone to the backbone telephone network. The cell phones
cannot communicate when they are unable to connect to the base station [2].
There are many applications that would greatly beneﬁt from using cell phones in ad hoc mode. During natural disasters,
such as hurricanes and earthquakes, the cellular phone and the traditional phone infrastructure are usually damaged. En-
abling cell phones to communicate in the ad hoc mode provides mechanisms for people trapped in buildings or elevators to
seek help. These networks can also help the agencies plan and coordinate the relief effort. The communication architecture
that we assume for emergency situations, is illustrated in Fig. 1. We assume that cell phones, besides their normal cellu-
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678 A. Durresi et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 77 (2011) 677–686Fig. 1. Ad hoc network of cell phones. Initially, the base stations are alive and all cell phones are connected to the base station. When the base stations
stop working, the effected cell phones communicate in ad hoc mode.
lar interface, are equipped with physical interface such as the 802.11 family to communicate among themselves in ad hoc
mode, when their infrastructure is no longer available. We also assume that, in emergency conditions, broadcast will be the
most needed model of communication. In addition, we also assume that cell phones can connect to the base station during
normal mode, and the ad hoc network during emergency mode, as shown in Fig. 1. The ability to switch from centralized
mode to ad hoc mode will allow cell phones to leverage the advantages of both systems.
The application of cell phones in ad hoc mode in emergency conditions requires data to be transmitted to all users.
Therefore, we consider that data conﬁdentiality is not a requirement. The ease with which a user can communicate with
a large number of other users makes this system vulnerable to attacks ranging from pranks to terrorist attacks. Terrorists
could artiﬁcially increase the population of an area by asking all other cell phone users to go there before a terrorist attack.
To ensure that the perpetrator of these attacks is identiﬁed, the proposed solution offers secure broadcast authentication
and guarantees non-repudiation. This approach is reactive because it identiﬁes the attacker after the attack. Clearly this is
not enough to stop all attacks that are possible with this system. Protocols need to be developed which would prevent a
malicious cell phone user from misguiding other users [3].
In this paper we present a scheme for reputation management and node revocation in a distributed ad hoc network of
cell phones. Each phone would have a reputation, score which is uniquely mapped to its ID. From here on we refer to the
cell phone as node and the reputation score as score. When a node believes that another node is malicious it attempts
to reduce the score of the node perceived to be misbehaving. When the score of a node becomes less than a predeﬁned
threshold, the node would then be revoked. This scheme also takes into account the fact that a malicious node may attempt
to revoke a honest node.
When the nodes are connected to the base station, they can obtain the necessary key information which is used to
communicate securely in the ad hoc mode. The base station assigns keys and ID’s for the nodes in the ad hoc mode. The
ID’s in the ad hoc mode are not related to the ID’s in the normal mode to ensure anonymity. For each node, there are n
other nodes which are given a share of the key required to sign the score certiﬁcate. Out of the node certiﬁers k need to
agree on a new score and sign a new certiﬁcate. When the network moves into the distributed mode from the centralized
mode, each node has to obtain certiﬁcates of score from its anonymous certiﬁers at regular intervals. Whenever a receiver
of a broadcast message believes that the sender is malicious, a message is sent to the anonymous certiﬁers of the node. The
certiﬁers remain anonymous because nodes communicate with them in the ad hoc mode without any knowledge of their
real identities. When the number of these messages becomes large, the anonymous certiﬁers give the node a new score
certiﬁcate. There may be special nodes in the network which have more than one share of the group key. These trusted
nodes may be important people like cops, mayors, etc. who we believe can be trusted. The number of shares of the key
given to each of those trusted nodes is a design parameter. We believe that the eﬃcient use of these trusted nodes would
give us the same level of security with less overhead.
Reputation is deﬁned as the perception that a node creates through past actions about its intentions and norms [4]. The
reputation of a node is based on the perception regarding its behavior held by other agents based on its experiences and
observations of its past actions [5]. Such experiences are conveyed through recommendations which can be both positive
and negative. The major challenge for reputation based systems is assessing the truthfulness of such recommendations.
In ad hoc networks, the absence of a commonly trusted entity means that the reputation system has to be distributed
to the nodes of the ad hoc network. When the system is distributed, there may be an issue of recommendations that
may contradict each other. The reputation systems in ad hoc networks need to be robust against contradicting reputa-
tions [6].
The three main attacks against a reputation based systems are the free rider problem, defamation and collusion [5]. In
the free rider problem nodes do not share the reputation information with their peers. If a signiﬁcant number of nodes do
not communicate about the misbehavior of malicious nodes, then the nodes of the network will not be able to identify the
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nodes. Although this is an important problem, its solution is out of the scope of this paper. The second attack on a reputation
based system is defamation. In this attack a malicious node attempts to defame a honest node and tries to get it revoked.
Our scheme handles this problem by increasing the number of nodes which believe that a particular node is malicious. Even
if a malicious node is part of the anonymous certiﬁers, it cannot sign a revocation certiﬁcate without (k − 1) other nodes.
The third common attack on reputation based systems is collusion. Here a node tries to improve the score of another node
by sending multiple positive feedbacks. Our scheme avoids this problem because scores are not increased in the ad hoc
mode. They are increased once the nodes go back to the centralized mode. The central base station would be able to track
multiple recommendations from the same node and prevent collusion.
This paper provides a mechanism to adjust the reputation score of a node in the ad hoc mode using threshold cryptog-
raphy. The scheme also allows a group of anonymous certiﬁers to revoke a node based on the recommendations of other
nodes. These recommendations are also subjected to scrutiny and there may be recommendations which provide feedback
on the quality of recommendations. This would ensure that nodes which broadcast malicious recommendations are also
revoked. The recommendation messages are designed in such a way that the recommenders and the recommended can be
identiﬁed unambiguously. All the information can be collected once the base station is back online. The base station can
then determine the malicious nodes. We would like to mention that the recommendations made by the users of the net-
work are based on their own experiences which may not be similar to the experiences of other nodes. This paper does not
deal with the aspect of decision making in these networks. There are many factors which may inﬂuence decision making
which are out of the scope of this paper.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents some related work in the area of trust and cryptography.
In Section 3 we discuss the system model for which we propose our scheme. Section 4 describes our scheme in detail.
Section 5 presents the analytical and simulation evaluation of our solution, and we conclude in Section 6.
2. Related work
We have proposed a protocol which can be used to establish non-refutable communication for cellular phones in the
ad hoc mode [7]. Unlike those of other ad hoc networks, the nodes of these networks are part of the centralized network
before they enter the ad hoc mode. This allows these base station to send all the key information securely using the secure
cellular infrastructure. We achieve secure non-repudiation in these networks by the use of Identity based cryptography.
Details on the implementation of this scheme are presented in the next section.
Security on Cellular Networks is discussed in [8]. In [9] are presented various ways to use cellular network in emergency
situations.
In [10] is presented one of the earlier works on trust. Reputation management has attracted much attention in ad hoc
network too [11–13]. Uncertainty is examined to reﬁne reputation computation in [14–18]. The effect of distrust propagation
is discussed in [19]. A good review of trust management in mobile ad hoc networks is presented in [20] and of trust for
online services in [21]. We have presented a solution for trust management in emergency networks in [22].
Kinateder and Rothermel describe two usage scenarios for a reputation based system, namely publishing recommenda-
tions and requesting recommendations [23]. In a publication based system, an entity which interacts with the target and
decides to create a recommendation, publishes (broadcasts) the recommendation to all nodes of the network. On the other
hand a requesting recommendation scenario is one where the entity which has to interact with the target enquires about
the reputation of the target. In this paper, we present another usage scenario where, the node in question stores its own
reputation value which is signed by the anonymous certiﬁers.
Many of the desired properties in a reputation based scheme for mobile ad hoc networks have been listed in [5]. The
system should be able to unambiguously distinguish between the malicious and non-malicious nodes without the use of
any centralized infrastructure. The system should also be robust to common attacks like node inactivity, defamation and
collusion by a small number of nodes. Another important requirement is the timeliness of the information provided. The
system would not useful if the malicious nodes are detected long after all the damage is done. Our scheme provides a
trade-off between the communication overhead and the timeliness of reputation information.
The lack of infrastructure in the ad hoc mode means that the schemes for trust establishment can only depend on the
local interaction of the nodes. In this situation trust management should start with a small group of trusted nodes which
gradually establishes trust with the initially neutral members of the network. The whole network evolves from trust islands
into a trust graph [24]. In the context of cell phones in the ad hoc mode, a broadcast would be trusted if the node can obtain
a certiﬁcate from one of the few trusted nodes in the network (like cops/mayor etc.). If the node leaves the neighborhood of
the trusted nodes, then their broadcasts have no trust. This approach may not be scalable if the number of nodes is much
greater than the number of trusted nodes. Moreover, mobility of various nodes would also cause problems with location
dependent security.
Ref. [25] utilizes threshold cryptography for the distribution of trust in the ad hoc mode. In this scheme signing key of
the CA can be split into n pieces such that each node gets a piece of the information. Any k of these n can be used to
recreate the private key of the CA. Even if (k − 1) malicious nodes collaborate, they would not be able to generate the key
information. The disadvantage of this scheme is that if the number of adversaries becomes more than k the security of the
680 A. Durresi et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 77 (2011) 677–686entire network is compromised. In our scheme, security decreases much more gracefully with the increase in the number
of attackers.
Ref. [26] presents a scheme which assumes that all nodes are connected to each other all the time. They all maintain a
proﬁle table which has the accusations against all the nodes of the network. The weights of the accusations of all nodes are
different. The weight of the accusation of a node depends on the number of accusations against itself. This paper assumes
that the all the nodes of the network would have exactly identical proﬁle tables and those which have a different proﬁle
table are malicious.
3. Systemmodel
The nodes of the network are cell phones. They have signiﬁcant battery power, computational power, communication
range and memory. This makes them suitable for the use of asymmetric key cryptography. Our scheme is useful only when
the cellular phone infrastructure is dysfunctional. Reputation Management and node revocation are trivial in a centralized
system because all nodes can communicate only through the base station. We assume that the number of base stations
that would be impaired at any point in time would be small. This combined with the fact that the communication range
of nodes is large, means that a node can send data to the entire network in few hops. We also assume that the density of
nodes in the deployment region is large. It is also assumed that more than k of the n anonymous certiﬁers for each node
would be honest. The values of k and n are calculated after analyzing the tradeoff between security and overhead.
The base station of the cellular network distributes all the key information which would be used by the nodes when
they are unable to connect to the base station. The base station creates an ID for each node which cannot be derived from
the ID of the phone. We believe that Identity based Cryptography (ID-PKC) [27,28] would be best suited to this scheme.
The base station generates a private key corresponding to each ID using some private information. The private key of each
node is securely transmitted to the node using the cellular infrastructure. ID-PKC avoids the overhead for the veriﬁcation
of certiﬁcates because the public keys are generated using the ID’s. If each node has to generate a new public/private key
pair and get the public key signed by the CA (base station), the overhead is high. Instead if the base station generates the
〈ID,PrivateKey〉 for each phone and sends this pair to the phone using the secured cellular infrastructure, the overhead is
considerably less. This scheme also takes the burden of key generation from the cell phone and gives it to the base station.
The private keys corresponding to an ID are generated using a Private Key Generator (PKG) of the cellular network. Any
node with the public key of the PKG can derive the public key of a node using its ID.
An ad hoc network of cell phones has more vulnerabilities than other instances of the mobile ad hoc networks because
node capture is trivial. One cannot prevent attackers from being parts of the network because cell phones are freely available
in the market for purchase. Any security scheme proposed for this environment must be able to address this problem. In
this paper we assume that the number of malicious nodes in the network is very small compared to the total nodes of the
network.
Based on the maximum number of malicious nodes expected, the tradeoff for the level of score when a node is revoked
are decided. We deﬁne the reputation score from 0 to 1, where 0 signiﬁes no trust and 1 signiﬁes maximum trust. The
initial score for each node is assigned by the base station. This score may be based on many factors like criminal history,
credit history etc. which are out of the scope of this paper.
The honest user of the network is the most important part of the detection of the malicious nodes. Whenever the cell
phone of a user receives a message, the user of the cell phone analyzes the message and performs the appropriate actions
for his safety. But, when a user believes that the message was incorrect (or malicious) he sends a negative recommendation
to all the anonymous certiﬁers of the sender. Free rider problem is a major problem in reputation based systems. This deals
with the willingness of the attacker to report the malicious behavior of a node. In this paper we assume that a honest node
would report the malicious behavior of a node because of the horriﬁc consequences which may be caused if the user does
not respond. We believe that a combination of laws with punishments for withholding information and reward for honest
participation may also help. This aspect of the protocol is for the law enforcement agencies to address and we believe that
it is out of the scope of this paper [29].
There may also be an incentive based approach where the honest user gets some beneﬁts for reporting the malicious
users.
4. Our scheme
In emergency situations when the base stations of the cellular network become dysfunctional, the nodes collaborate and
form an ad hoc network. These networks can be used by users to communicate information and coordinate relief effort. This
application is very powerful because a user can communicate with all the other users of the network. To detect the misuse
and abuse of this system, a strong implementation of non-repudiation is required. All the messages sent during the ad
hoc phase can be analyzed once the network returns to the centralized mode i.e. base stations start functioning. The main
drawback of this approach is that the malicious nodes are detected only after the attack. This is clearly not enough defence
against attacks which are meant to cause massive destruction and loss of lives. To prevent these attacks from occurring, a
mechanism is needed to revoke the malicious nodes as soon as they are detected. We solve this problem using a reputation
based scheme where the malicious nodes are detected and revoked.
A. Durresi et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 77 (2011) 677–686 681We have developed a protocol for key distribution in an ad hoc network of cellular phones [7]. Our protocol utilizes the
property in cellular phones where information required during the ad hoc mode can be securely distributed to the nodes
using the infrastructure of the cellular network. Once the nodes go into the ad hoc mode they use this information to
communicate with other nodes. We build this reputation based system on top of our existing protocol for non-repudiation
which uses identity based cryptography.
The protocol assumes that each node has a private key corresponding to its ID in the ad hoc mode. We want to emphasize
here that the ID of a node in the ad hoc mode is not same as its ID in the cellular mode. This is done to ensure anonymity
in the ad hoc mode. This also prevents adversaries from mounting attacks against speciﬁc nodes of the network. If a node
broadcasts messages using a known identity, the node’s location privacy may be compromised. These problems are resolved
when we use separate ID’s for each node. These ID’s are assigned by the base station and only the base station is able to
derive the real ID of a node from the ad hoc ID.
The protocol starts with the base station assigning each node an ID, private key corresponding to the ID. Messages signed
using the public key can be veriﬁed using the ID. The IDs are divided into groups such that each group has an ID which is
the function of the IDs of all the nodes in the group. The private key corresponding to the group ID is split into n shares
of which any k shares could reconstruct the group key successfully. For each node all the members in its group are its
anonymous certiﬁers. Each node is given its reputation score in the form of a certiﬁcate which has the its ID and score. The
certiﬁcate is signed by the private key of its group. Anyone with the ID of the node (from which the ID of the group can be
derived) can verify the score of a node.
After the nodes enter the ad hoc mode, the broadcast messages to the entire network. Whenever the receiver of a
broadcast message believes that the sender of the message is malicious, the receiver sends a negative recommendation
to all the autonomous certiﬁers. When the current certiﬁcate of the sender expires, it would need a new certiﬁcate from
the anonymous certiﬁers. The new certiﬁcate would reﬂect the negative recommendations for the node and reduce the
reputation score of the node. If the reputation score of a node goes below a certain threshold, the anonymous certiﬁers
revoke the node by broadcasting the revocation message in the network. The size of each group is made large enough that
each node has at least k nodes in its communication range of about 10 sq miles [30]. Once a certiﬁcate is generated by any
k nodes of the autonomous group, it is transmitted to the other nodes of the autonomous group.
The nodes save the messages that they have sent and received in the ad hoc mode. After the base station is revived, all
nodes send their messages to the base station for audit. The base station performs and audit of the messages to ascertain
if any of the nodes misbehaved. This audit would determine if any nodes attempted to spread misinformation against the
honest nodes or sent positive recommendations for the malicious nodes.
For clear illustration we divide our scheme into 3 stages which are pre ad hoc mode, ad hoc mode and post ad hoc
mode. We describe each of these stages in detail.
• Pre Ad Hoc Mode: In this stage the nodes are connected to the base station. This stage is performed at regular intervals
to provide the latest information for the nodes in the ad hoc mode. The frequency with which the information in the
nodes is updated is a tradeoff between overhead and accuracy. In this stage each node receives a reputation score and
a share of the private key of the group to which it belongs along with its ID and private key [7]. The ID of each node
is a combination of the group ID and the node ID. We represent the ID of a node P with IDP and the group ID is
represented by GP . The private key corresponding to any ID sent by the base station is represented by SKID . SKGP /n is
1 share out of n for the reconstruction of the private key of the group. The communication from the base station can
be represented as BS.
BS → P : Ks[IDP ‖ SKP ‖ SKGP /n ‖ SCOREP ] (1)
where
SCOREP = SKGP [P ‖ Value ‖ timestamp] (2)
The frequency at which this information is updated is a design parameter for the network administrators.
• Ad Hoc Mode: The nodes enter this stage when they fail to connect to the base station. Nodes can broadcast messages
in this medium using the private keys that they received in the previous stage [7]. When the node P wants to broadcast
in this environment it signs the message with its public key and sends the score certiﬁcate along with the broadcast.
Sender: SKID[M, ID] ‖ ID ‖ SCOREID (3)
The receivers are able to verify the signature on the message using the ID of the node and they are able to verify the
score using the ID of the group to which the sender belongs.
Receiver: PKID
[
SKID[M, ID]
]
(4)
Receiver: PKGID [ID ‖ Value ‖ timestamp] (5)
Once a receiver believes that a sender is malicious, the receiver sends a negative recommendation to all the anonymous
certiﬁers of the sender. These nodes are all the nodes in the sender’s group excluding the sender. When the current
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recommendations and collaboratively sign the new score with the private key of the group to which the sender belongs.
Let R be the receiver and S be the sender.
R → GS : SKR [RECOR ] ‖ IDR (6)
The recommendation itself contains the ID of the recommender, ID of the recommended and the type of recom-
mendation. It is then signed by the private key of the recommender. This is done to ensure the authenticity of the
recommender and the recommended. The type of recommendation can have the different levels of positive and nega-
tive recommendations that a recommender can make.
RECOR = SKR [IDR ‖ IDS ‖ Value] (7)
We understand that the distributed nature of these networks may mean that the recommendations at all the anonymous
certiﬁers may not be the same. Whenever an anonymous certiﬁer reaches a threshold for the negative recommenda-
tions, it starts the process of getting the particular node revoked. If there are enough anonymous certiﬁers which believe
that a node needs to be revoked, they can generate a revocation message. There may be a situation where the malicious
node broadcasts only one malicious message after which it may not broadcast any other message. To prevent it from
broadcasting other messages, the anonymous certiﬁers can issue no certiﬁcate in the future, but that will not discredit
the message sent with a malicious certiﬁcate. This can be prevented by the anonymous certiﬁers by broadcasting the
revocation certiﬁcate in case the reputation score goes below a threshold.
There are many schemes in literature which implement the distributed generation of a signature without any one of the
collaborators knowing the signature [31,32]. One of these schemes can be used by the anonymous certiﬁers to generate
the private key of the group without any of the certiﬁers knowing the actual key.
• Post Ad Hoc Mode: Nodes enter this stage when they are able to connect to the base station after the ad hoc mode. In
this stage all the messages sent and received in the ad hoc mode by each node are audited. This may also involve the
use of the law enforcement agencies to investigate users of the cell phones for the messages that were sent out during
the ad hoc mode.
This stage may be used for correcting any of the trust scores set during the ad hoc mode. Nodes may be rewarded or
punished based on their behavior in the ad hoc mode. The recommendations made by the nodes may also be analyzed
to determine if a given node is a collaborator of the malicious node. Such nodes may be revoked in the centralized
system which is trivial. The post ad hoc node also gives the network administrators an opportunity to correct any
mistakes like the revocation of honest nodes, which may have been made in the ad hoc mode. This stage helps in
obtaining better reputation scores for nodes when the enter the ad hoc mode in the future.
5. Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the protocol through mathematical analysis and simulations. We ﬁrst list all the terminology
and parameters used in this section. The values of these parameters would inﬂuence the security and overhead of this
scheme.
• Group Compromise: All the nodes of the network are divided into groups. For each node of the group, all the other
nodes act as the anonymous certiﬁers. If the number of malicious nodes in a group is more than the number of nodes
required to reconstruct the private key of the group, then the group is said to be compromised.
• Node Compromise: When a group is compromised, all the nodes in the group which are not malicious can be revoked.
We refer to this as node compromise.
• Area of Network Deployment: This is the total area across which the network is deployed. We assume that the
communication range of a node is equal in all directions. We represent the deployment region as a circle for clear
illustration.
• Group Size: It is the number of elements in each group. This is a critical design parameter because for the same
level of threshold, if the size of the group is small the probability of there existing a malicious node in the group is
also small. On the other hand a small group size reduces the possibility of each node having enough certiﬁers in its
neighborhood.
• Threshold: It is the number of anonymous certiﬁers required to reconstruct the certiﬁcate of the group. A lower value
of threshold makes the group vulnerable to compromise by a small number of malicious nodes whereas a large value of
threshold increases the overhead required for generating a signature. It is also much harder for a node to ﬁnd enough
certiﬁers to refresh its score certiﬁcate.
• Denial of Service: Threshold cryptography works when the number of malicious nodes is less than the threshold. But, if
the number of malicious nodes in threshold cryptography is large enough such that they are able to prevent the signing
of score certiﬁcates then the whole system would become dysfunctional. For an (n,k) threshold scheme, the number of
nodes required to sign the certiﬁcate is k but the number of nodes required to prevent the signing of the certiﬁcate is
(n − k).
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a certiﬁcate presents a tradeoff between security and overhead. If the lifetime of a certiﬁcate is small, the overhead
for signing the certiﬁcates on the network would be larger whereas security would be better because the number of
broadcasts which can be made by a node is limited.
5.1. Theoretical analysis
We now analyze the probability of a group being compromised which is equivalent to the probability of k out of n nodes
of the group being compromised. Let the total number of nodes in the network be N with α being the total malicious
nodes in the network. The probability of a particular node being malicious is αN and the probability of a node belonging to
a particular group is nN . The probability of a node being malicious and belonging to a particular group is the product of the
two probabilities which is nα
N2
. Therefore the probability of k nodes of a group being compromised is
PC =
(
nα
N2
)k
(8)
This equation presents some interesting results. If the number of nodes in the network increases, the probability of a
malicious node belonging to a particular group decreases, which reduces the probability of the group being compromised.
An increase in the value of group size would mean that the malicious groups are distributed across fewer groups as a result
of which the probability of a group being compromised increases. The most important factor that inﬂuences group security
is the threshold. A higher threshold would reduce the probability of group compromise exponentially.
We now analyze the problem of Denial of Service in a group. If the number of malicious nodes in a group is less than
the threshold value, they will be unable to sign the certiﬁcates. But, they can cause DoS by not participating in the signing
of score certiﬁcates of other nodes of the network. For an (n,k) threshold scheme, if the number of malicious nodes α is
greater than (n − k), the group is vulnerable to DoS because without the participation of malicious nodes the honest nodes
of the network cannot create signatures. To make this scheme robust to DoS attacks the following conditions have to be
satisﬁed.
α  (n − k) (9)
The best possible robustness against DoS is achieved when the group is resilient against (k − 1) malicious nodes. If
α = k − 1 then
k − 1 n − k (10)
⇒ k n − 1
2
(11)
If the value of α is greater than q, then the group is compromised.
Let the deployment region have a radius of R and each node have a communication range of r. We assume that the
nodes of a group are deployed uniformly throughout the network. Let the density of nodes be ρ . For an (n,k) threshold
scheme, the minimum number of nodes within the communication range of a node is k. Therefore the minimum density of
nodes required is
ρ = k
πr2
(12)
If the total area of the network is π R2, the minimum number of nodes required for each group n would be
n = k
(
R
r
)2
(13)
With the increase in the area of deployment, the number of nodes required in each group increases. We believe that the
area of the deployment region would be comparable to the communication range of the nodes.
5.2. Simulation results
We have also simulated the different aspects of this paper. The simulations bring out the relations between the different
aspects of this paper.
In Fig. 2 we present the basic principle of threshold cryptography. It shows the relation between threshold, overhead and
risk. As the threshold increases, the overhead required to reconstruct the shared secret increases. Each node has to generate
a partial signature to the score certiﬁcate which is then combined to generate the ﬁnal score certiﬁcate. As a result overhead
is directly proportional to the threshold. Risk on the other hand is inversely proportional to threshold. If the threshold is 1,
the risk is the highest. As the value of threshold increases, the number of nodes which are required to sign the certiﬁcate
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overhead needed to reconstruct the secret increases.
Fig. 3. This ﬁgure shows the relation between the number of anonymous certiﬁers within communication range and the area of network deployment. r/R
indicates the ratio of the radius of the deployment region to the communication range of a node.
increases. This is clearly illustrated in Fig. 2. In this ﬁgure we assume that each node of the network has only share of
the group private key. If the use of some pre trusted nodes like cops are made, the risk of threshold cryptography can be
lowered.
In Fig. 3 we show the relationship between the network size and the number of nodes which are within communication
range. The communication range of each node is assumed to be constant. The area of deployment is assumed to be circular
and represented in terms of the communication range of each node. This simulation assumes that there are 10000 nodes in
the network and the number of anonymous certiﬁers are distributed uniformly throughout the network. We can clearly see
that with the increase in the area of the network, the number of anonymous certiﬁers decreases dramatically. We believe
that in a real world implementations the sizes of the groups would be very large compared to the threshold size to be able
to cover a reasonably large deployment area. We also believe that the size of the ad hoc network would be comparable to
the communication range of the nodes.
In Fig. 4, we present the relationship between the number of nodes compromised when a certain number of nodes are
malicious for different values of group size. A node is compromised when at least k nodes of its group are malicious. In this
simulation, the number total number of nodes is taken as 10000. We perform this simulation for different values of the
group sizes. All the values in Fig. 4 are represented as a percentage of the total nodes in the network. When the number
of malicious nodes is small, an increase the number of malicious nodes does not compromise honest nodes because the
number of malicious nodes in all groups is less than the threshold. As the number of malicious nodes increases, the number
of groups in which the number of malicious nodes is greater than the threshold increases suddenly. This ﬁgure shows that
as long as the number of malicious nodes is small compared to the total nodes (around 1–2%), the number of nodes
compromised is negligible. Fig. 4 also shows that an increase in group size increases the number of groups compromised
for a given level of malicious nodes. This behavior is expected because when the group size is increased and the threshold
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nodes are spread across fewer groups. Hence the rapid increase in nodes compromised. Values are represented as fractions of total nodes.
Fig. 5. This ﬁgure shows the relation between the nodes compromised and the threshold. As the threshold increases the value of nodes compromised
decreases. The nodes compromised and malicious nodes are a fraction of the total nodes of the network whereas the threshold is a fraction of group size.
is kept constant, the malicious nodes are spread across fewer groups. As a result the number of malicious nodes in each
group is higher and the number of malicious nodes reaches the group threshold faster.
In Fig. 5, we present the relationship between the nodes compromised and the threshold. Intuitively, an increase in
the value of threshold would result in better security and thus, fewer compromised nodes. In this ﬁgure, threshold is
represented as a fraction of the group size whereas the nodes compromised and the malicious nodes are represented as
fractions of total nodes in the network. For this simulation, the group size was taken as 100 and the network size was taken
as 10000. For a high value of malicious nodes at 5%, a threshold of 15% of group size achieves zero compromised nodes.
We believe that in such networks the number of malicious nodes would be negligible when compared to the total nodes in
the network.
6. Conclusions
We presented a distributed scheme for reputation management in an ad hoc network of cell phones. The nodes of this
network, cellular phones, are able to communicate with each other when the nodes are unable to connect to the base
station of the ad hoc network. In this operating environment our earlier paper had developed a key distribution scheme for
the ad hoc mode using the secure cellular infrastructure [7].
Each node of this network is assigned a reputation score based on various factors like criminal record, credit history etc.
We presented a scheme which not only alters the reputation score based on the recommendations of other nodes of the
network but also revokes the nodes when this score goes below a certain threshold. This is achieved by dividing the nodes
into different groups such that each all the elements of a group act as the anonymous certiﬁers for a node. Each group has
a key which is distributed across all the nodes of the group. This key is used to sign score certiﬁcates for individual nodes
in such a way that no one node knows the secret. This key is also used to sign the revocation message which is broadcasted
throughout the network. In this paper, we analyzed the factors which would help the network administrator ﬁne tune this
scheme.
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